This presentation outlines the role of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the aviation executing agency of  the United Nations.  It discusses ICAO's mandate to standardize and regulate for safety, efficiency and regularity.  The governing protocols of ICAO are the Articles of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, (the Chicago Convention).  These Articles establish the privileges and restrictions of all Contracting States and provide for the adoption of International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) regulating international air transport. 

Article 25 of the Convention places an obligation upon Contracting States to Aprovide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in (their) territories as (they) may find practicable@.  This obligation forms the basis for civil aviation search and rescue (SAR) services worldwide. 

SARPs governing SAR services are presented in Annex 12 to the Chicago Convention.  These SARPs outline requirements for areas of responsibility, the location of rescue coordination centres (RCCs), communications facilities, rescue units and equipment.

More detailed information of an organizational and operational nature is contained within the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, a joint production of ICAO and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 

The foundation for the global SAR structure is the agreement by States contracted to the Chicago Convention to cooperate in the application of Standards that govern response to events of aeronautical distress.  Cooperation is the mainstay of the system at all its levels.  It is the subject of clear reference in Annex 12 and of wide application in the IAMSAR Manual.   

Standards can only be effective when an infrastructure is  in place. Many States are hard pressed to provide a complete system.  The most practical method to provide an effective world-wide SAR service is to develop regional systems offering improved services, more resources and wider coverage at reduced cost.   

It is a major challenge to SAR planners and administrators to manage globalization in the context of accelerating technological and organizational change.  This paper discusses the nature of aeronautical SAR activity and highlights the high consequences of error and inefficiency. Reference is made to the paradoxical nature of change affecting international SAR: its benefits and its demands,  and investigates the intersection between organizational structure and inidual and group performance.

Despite radical improvement in system support, it is essential to maintain focus on the human at the centre of SAR operations.  This process can be begun by recognising human sovereignty in the RCC and establishing, as fundamental policy, that SAR is a humanitarian service, performed by human beings for human beings.  The meaningful application of this policy requires an understanding of human needs, of personality and motivation. 

The paper concludes that the best strategy for optimizing work place performance in the SAR domain and, at the same time, minimizing the incidence of operational errors, is to design systems that are human-centred, make plans that are responsive to human capabilities and limitations, and give encouragement for the full expression of workers potential.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency of the  United Nations (UN) devoted to the safety, efficiency and regularity of international aeronautical transportation.  The governing protocols of ICAO are the Articles of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944, (the Chicago Convention).   ICAO is charged with the administration of the principles laid out in the Convention.  In ICAO Headquarters, Montreal, search and rescue (SAR) is the responsibility of the Air Traffic Management Section of the Air Navigation Bureau and, specifically, 30% of one person's time.

The reason for ICAO coming into being is to be found in the events of the 1940s.  The Second World War was a powerful catalyst for the technical development of the aeroplane.  At the end of the war, a vast network of passenger and freight operations had been set up but it lacked high level, organisational structure, especially in its international dimension.  Just as the aeroplane had been a devastatingly effective instrument of war, it was realised that it could be outstandingly effective in supporting and benefitting a world at peace.   

The Chicago Convention has 96 Articles. The fundamental principle underwriting the Convention is that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.   The Convention also provides that no scheduled international air service may operate over or into the territory of a Contracting State without its previous consent.

SAR features as a legal obligation in Article 25 of the Chicago Convention which states that AEach contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable ....  Each contracting State, when undertaking search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in coordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time ...@.  These coordinated measures are expressed as Standards and Recommended Practices in Annex 12 to the Convention.  They cover matters of establishment, maintenance and operation of SAR services both in the territories of Contracting States and over the high seas.

The first Standard articulated in the Annex requires that AContracting States shall arrange for the establishment and provision of search and rescue services within their territories.  Such services shall be provided on a 24-hour basis.@  That reads simply but requires a lot.  The Annex goes on with SARPs that provide for delineated areas of responsibility, rescue coordination centres (RCCs), communications facilities, rescue units and rescue equipment.  These make up some of the fundamentals of an organization.  I say some, because equally necessary are the more abstract qualities of sound management, insightful planning and well-trained personnel.  Only then can we realistically say that we have brought an effective system into play.  

The third chapter in the Annex, is headed ACo-operation@.  The fact that an entire chapter in this Annex is dedicated to cooperation is indicative of its importance.  I want to focus this morning on some aspects of this vital concept of cooperation, particularly cooperation between States within a region and cooperation between administrators (by which is meant planners, regulators and managers) and RCC operations personnel.

Unlike other aviation services which are examples of physical sciences designed to meet both an operational and a commercial end, SAR requires the exercise of some highly refined social sciences and has as its end the preservation of endangered human life.  The specialness of SAR, then, lies in its humanitarian ethic, as distinct from other services= commercial imperative.

Annex 12 is extensively expanded upon in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, a joint publication of ICAO and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  At its outset, the IAMSAR Manual acknowledges the impracticality of State SAR administrations taking sole responsibility for the provision of all the resources necessary to conduct SAR operations.  For some States - not a few - it is impossibile for them to do so; it is simply beyond their financial capacity to provide every necessary resource.  This is the  primary reason for the development of co-operative policies between agencies within States and between States themselves: to make provision for the shared use of assets.  There are many other benefits that are to be derived from cooperation at various levels and the IAMSAR manual expounds on these.  It encourages cooperation between government and industry, civilian and military, aeronautical and maritime, air traffic control and SAR. 

Cooperation, in short, is the key to each State meeting its obligations under the Chicago Convention.  In isolation, few States could meet their obligations; in cooperation, almost every State can satisfy its own SAR needs effectively and affordably and, at the same time, assist other neighbouring States to meet theirs.

From an organizational viewpoint, the contemporary application of this principle of cooperation is spelt out in the IAMSAR manual under the heading: The Global Concept.  The manual defines the ICAO goal as being Ato provide a world-wide SAR system that will provide assistance to all persons in distress regardless of nationality or circumstance.@  It goes on to observe that Athe fastest, most effective and practical way to achieve this goal is to develop regional systems associated with each ocean area and continent.@   

We should pause to consider the nature of aeronautical SAR.  Aviation organizations have particular characteristics that set them apart from organizations in general. They are part of a sub-set referred to as Ahigh technology@ and Ahigh reliability@ organizations that provide goods and services deemed to be critical to society.  Nuclear energy and defence are cases in point.  Defence is  Ahigh risk@ because of the venturous nature of military activities and because a mistake may lead to unacceptable consequences.

International aviation still enjoys low levels of risk but the accidents that do occur emphasise how the industry is associated with extremely high stakes.  Aeronautical SAR, risk wise, is set somewhere between defence activity and regular aviation operations but is firmly placed in the context of extremely high stakes. Within all these types of organizations, it is reliability rather than productivity that is the overriding goal.  The focus in these organizations - the focus in the provision of SAR - must be on extremely reliable operations.

There is a tension in the contemporary circumstance. At the same time as the nature of the SAR task is demanding organizational stability and reliability, society is subject to unprecedented and continuous change.  There is change technically, change socially, change economically and change politically.  There is only, ever, it seems, change.   

There have been dramatic improvements to the technical aspects of both aircraft and air traffic management systems over the past few decades.  At the same time, satellite technology has gone a long way to minimizing the search element of search and rescue. The technology being brought to bear is at once smart and complex.  But while it has potential for wide application and greatly improving system effectiveness, it introduces a new realm for error in which cause and effect are much more difficult to find out.

In that regard, while there have been constant improvements in technology and management practices, it is significant that human errors are remaining constant over time, As a result, accidents continue to happen and the requirement for an effective SAR service will continue into the foreseeable future.  Within the SAR system itself, risk of operational error remains real, not least because of the sweeping changes in the environment in which SAR is provided and the impact of these changes on the SAR work force.

Some SAR organizations have responded decisively to contemporary pressures.  With changes in the demands on the service, some providers have re-organized to react more flexibly.  They have, for example, commissioned joint maritime and aeronautical RCCs and established work forces of multi-skilled operators.  

But as RCCs have responded to external forces, internal pressures have grown in turn and introduced scope for errors of a different magnitude and type.  This new circumstance has been brought about by changes to job functions, responsibilities, and skill and knowledge requirements within the RCC.  

An increased reliance on IT has resulted - along with woinderful benefits - in new challenges within the RCC.   The ever-greater capabilities of IT have been accompanied by increased complexities.  Skill demands have grown and the cycle of change begetting change has been reinforced.  Indeed, in the RCC, as in everyt modern workplace, new  technology and the demands of industry and society have led to the very re-conceptualization of work. As new work practices have evolved, those practices have spawned a covering policy and that policy has given rise to expectations of ever higher levels of service.  This has happened almost incidentally. All this has occurred in an environment of organizational transition.  Traditional organizational boundaries have become blurred, fused and uncertain.  Now, as a result, there is a threat of SAR services being driven more by change and technology than by carefully considered Standards developed in anticipation of the industry's needs. Standards should be proactive, not reactive.  It is now time for planners and managers to catch this tiger by the tail and reassert their authority. 

There is a paradox here.  On the one hand, the pressures of user requirements, technological innovation and social change are demanding that the SAR system becomes more adaptable, innovative and sophisticated.  On the other hand, the establishment of standards ever further beyond the reach of some States is to guarantee weak sections in the fabric of the global system.  There is, then, a risk that the intervention of chance will exploit system weaknesses and culminate in catastrophe.  A regional organizational strategy can, however, strengthen the weak links and lead to a more effective world wide service coverage. 

There is another perspective that we should not neglect.  It takes us to the junction of organizational change and workplace performance.  It has to do with the impact of change on personal wellbeing.  The steep learning curves, the constant re-structuring and the high stakes of SAR activity are making RCC environments characteristically volatile.  On-going volatility impacts on staff, it creates stress, disillusionment, fear of job loss and a general lack of certainty.  

After years of this, there is a growing realisation that what is needed in high reliability systems is not just technical investment but socio-technical investment.  This requires, at the start, an acknowledgement that at the core of operations, still and for the foreseeable future, is the human being. The human being needs to be properly equipped, actively supported and strongly encouraged.  

To advance this approach, we must come to a fundamental understanding of the nature of human needs, of personality and motivation.  Researchers agree that it is highly likely that motivation, to some extent, is a product of an individual's personality.  Personality, further, will change, with the environment within which persons function.  Managers can strongly influence that environment.

Workers have a need for achievement.  It's for managers to give them scope to achieve. Workers desire an affiliation - a sense of identity - with a group.  It's for managers to cultivate group norms that are attractive.  Workers, especially high achievers, seek after power, not  so much power over others but opportunity to give expression to their own potential, over tasks and over challenges.  It's for managers to so empower them.  There is, then, a substantial role for managers to play in facilitating frontline operators' high performance.  By doing this, managers can both satisfy workers'aspirations and proactively guard against human error.

Managers need to extend their concern to the human components in the organizational structure: its disposition, its relationships and its points of interface. 

It may be that in hearing of human error, managers detach a little and think of the source of errors as the aircraft cockpit, the ship bridge or, in the case of SAR mission coordination, the RCC alone.  That would be a serious mistake. Some findings of accident investigations have highlighted the ineptitude of managers and planners more than front line personnel and exposed their procedures, arrangements and system construction as primary accident causal factors.

In summarising the events leading to the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise, and after acknowledging the active errors of the ferry crew, Mr Justice Sheen, said, A...the underlying faults lay higher up in the company....From top to bottom, the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness@  (Sheen, 1987, in Maurino, Reason, Johnston & Lee, 1995, p.1).

In a similar vein, Commissioner Moshansky, in introducing his findings to the crash of a Fokker F28 at Dryden, Ontario, wrote: AThe accident at Dryden ... was not the result of one cause but a combination of several related factors.  Had the system operated effectively, each of the factors might have been identified and corrected before it took on significance.  It will be shown that this accident was a failure in the air transportation system@ (Moshansky, 1992, in Maurino, Reason, Johnston & Lee, 1995, p.2). 

The principle is clear.  Error attributable to human factors should be of as much concern to managers as it is to front line operators.  Both managers and staff, oficers and men, have direct responsibility for safe practice.  Underpinning all safe practice must be a sound organization, sufficient training, proper procedures and a lively, healthy work ethic.  

In this connection, ICAO has recently produced a document entitled Human Factors Guidelines for Air Traffic Management Systems (Doc 9758), some of the content of which would be helpful to SAR managers. It gives guidance on how a pro-active approach to safety can assist in accident prevention.  This, of course, is the mainstay of preventive SAR.

In an aviation environment in which so much is changing: technology, organization and traffic density, and yet much of consequence remains the same, the human factor being the most important, the challenge to States is to apply the proven elements of the Chicago Convention in a way most relevant to contemporary needs.

This, in short, means to uphold the Standards of Annex 12 in a spirit of cooperation, with a vision that extends beyond insular practices and geographic boundaries and as a willing participant in the global SAR plan. While the challenges faced by State authorities are increasing in number and complexity, the provisions of the Chicago Convention stand on a foundation of long and satisfactory service provision and I believe they will continue to stand the test and give the lead in the delivery of the special service of Search and Rescue well into the 21st century.